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1.I n t r o d u c t i o n
he Federal Reserve’s Fedwire funds transfer service is the 
biggest large-value payments system in the United States 
in terms of participants, value, volume, and use by other 
settlement systems. Although Fedwire funds activity has long 
been concentrated in the late afternoon, recently there has been 
a noticeable shift to later in the day. The value of funds activity 
after 17:00 has increased from 20 percent in 1998 to more than 
30 percent in 2005 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System 2006). In 2006, the Federal Reserve commented on the 
risk posed by this change:
“From an operational risk perspective, delaying the 
sending of large payments until late in the day increases 
the potential magnitude of liquidity dislocation and risk 
in the financial industry if late-in-the-day operational 
disruptions should occur. An increase in such risk is 
particularly troublesome in an era of heightened concern 
about operational disruptions from a range of sources” 
(Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2006).
There is a complex set of trade-offs between risks and costs 
in large-value payments systems (Bank for International 
Settlements 2005). Theory suggests that the concentration of 
late-afternoon Fedwire activity is the result of coordination 
among banks to reduce liquidity costs, delay costs, and credit 
risks. As these costs and risks change over time, we would 
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• The Federal Reserve’s Fedwire funds transfer 
service has long displayed a concentrated 
peak of activity in the late afternoon. 
￿ Sending large payments late in the day can 
heighten operational risk by increasing the 
potential magnitude of liquidity dislocation 
and risk if operational disruptions occur.
￿ A study of the distribution of Fedwire 
payments finds that the peak of the timing 
distribution has become more concentrated, 
has shifted to later in the day, and has been 
divided into two peaks. 
￿ These trends are likely explained by a higher 
value of payments transferred, the settlement 
patterns of private settlement institutions, 
and increased industry concentration. 
￿ The study uncovers no specific evidence 
of heightened operational risk associated 
with late activity, but it points to a high level 
of interaction between Fedwire and private 
settlement institutions.
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expect the timing of payment activity to be affected. In this 
article, we seek to quantify how the changing environment in 
which Fedwire operates has affected the timing of payment 
value transferred within the system.
We observe several trends in payment timing from 1998 to 
2006. After 2000, the peak in payment activity shifts to later 
in the day. Indeed, post-2000, a greater concentration of 
payments occurs after 17:00. At the same time, however, several 
factors have been associated with increased payment activity 
early in the day, such as the creation of the Continuous Linked 
Settlement (CLS) Bank, an institution that settles U.S. dollar 
payments early in the morning; changes to the Clearing House 
Interbank Payments System’s (CHIPS) settlement practices; 
and expanded Fedwire operating hours. Despite these 
developments, we find that the distribution of payment activity 
across the day still peaks more in the late afternoon.
Payments made through Fedwire are distributed through-
out the operating day, so no single statistic fully captures 
the changes in timing that we observe. To analyze the timing 
of payments on Fedwire, we measure the times at which 
each percentile of value transferred on a particular day was 
completed. In addition, we use regression analysis to examine 
factors associated with the intraday timing of each percentile of 
value transferred by Fedwire over time. Explanatory variables 
here include changes in the Federal Reserve’s Payments System 
Risk Policy and the activity of settlement systems. We measure 
the effects of multiple explanatory variables on the whole time 
distribution of payments to understand more fully why parts 
of the Fedwire timing distribution have changed.
Our study focuses on two notable changes that have affected 
the higher percentiles of value transferred on Fedwire: the 
60th-90th percentiles. First, the most concentrated period of 
value transfer on Fedwire has moved to later in the day, from 
16:48 to 17:11; second, the concentration of Fedwire value 
transferred has increased. Together, these changes have 
resulted in greater percentages of value transferred after 17:00.1 
Our analysis suggests that these changes are explained largely 
by the change in the timing of CHIPS end-of-day settlement 
activity, growth in the volume and value of Fedwire payments, 
and growth in the pattern of industry concentration (a measure 
1 We measure this peak as the median daily time of the top ten minutes of 
Fedwire value.
of the amount of Fedwire value submitted by different system 
participants).
Our study proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the 
literature on models of banks’ payment timing decisions.2 
Section 3 considers how Fedwire payments are currently 
distributed across the time of day and how the distribution has 
changed over time. In Section 4, we use regression analysis to 
examine which factors have been most relevant in explaining 
these trends. Section 5 focuses on the influence that settlement 
institutions have on the timing of Fedwire payments. We 
conclude with a brief summary of our observations and offer 
suggestions for further research.
2. Literature Review
Banks seek to minimize the costs associated with sending 
payments. The existing models of banks’ payment-sending 
behavior generally focus on four factors: the cost of liquidity, 
the cost of delay, uncertainty (both strategic and structural) 
and settlement risk, and the instruction arrival process.
The cost to banks of settling a payment is a function of 
the cost of liquidity used to send the payment and the cost 
associated with delaying it. The cost of liquidity is the cost a 
bank faces when using account balances (usually modeled as 
being held at the central bank) in a payments system. This cost 
is often zero as long as the bank has a positive balance in its 
account and nonzero if the bank needs to borrow money to 
settle the payment. In Fedwire, the Federal Reserve provides 
intraday (daylight) credit in the form of overdrafts for which 
banks are charged a marginal fee, if the bank is eligible for 
daylight credit and has exceeded the amount of credit that falls 
within a deductible amount (Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System 2004). Many other payments systems provide 
collateralized intraday liquidity at zero marginal cost after the 
bank posts collateral. An additional source of liquidity in 
payments systems is the overnight money market for federal 
funds and repos. The cost of delay is the compensation a bank 
must pay a customer for a delayed payment or the reputational 
damage and loss of future business a bank suffers from delaying 
customer payment requests (Angelini 1998).
Angelini (1998, 2000) considers the behavior of banks vis-à-
vis liquidity and delay costs in a real-time gross settlement 
(RTGS) payments system. He shows that the equilibrium in an 
RTGS system involves excessive delay of payments, as banks do 
not fully internalize the benefits to other banks from the receipt 
2 For simplicity of exposition, we use the term banks to refer to direct 
participants in the payments system, although these participants may not 
necessarily be banks.
We seek to quantify how the changing 
environment in which Fedwire operates 
has affected the timing of payment value 
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of funds. Bech and Garratt (2003) find that RTGS systems can 
be characterized by multiple equilibria, with the relative costs 
of liquidity and delay determining whether the system has an 
early or late equilibrium. Additionally, whether intraday 
liquidity is provided as priced or collateralized credit influences 
the type of “game” and the associated equilibria that would 
result. Other papers that consider how changes in liquidity 
prices affect payment timing are Bech (2008) and Mills and 
Nesmith (2008). Green (2005) discusses the welfare impli-
cations of these models and questions whether there are social 
costs to delay.
Kahn, McAndrews, and Roberds (2003), Mills and Nesmith 
(2008), and Bech (2008) focus on settlement risk in payments 
systems. Settlement risk is the uncertainty to which banks are 
subject when they face the choice of submitting or delaying 
a payment. Participant A may expect an offsetting payment 
from Participant B to occur later in the day. However, 
uncertainty about whether Participant B might either default 
or delay sending payment until the next day can result in 
Participant A’s decision to delay delivery of its payment to 
the RTGS system.
An important but often overlooked assumption of these 
models is the time at which customers submit payment 
instructions to their bank. It is only after a bank receives an 
instruction from its customer (including the bank itself) that 
the bank decides whether to send settlement instructions to the 
payments system or delay settlement. An observed late-day 
distribution of payments could occur either because banks 
delay payments or because banks receive payment instructions 
late in the day. For example, after CLS Bank began operations, 
banks had a new stream of payments to submit at a particular 
time of day, which can cause significant changes in the overall 
value time distribution of payments. 
A factor that has not been discussed in the literature but may 
influence payment timing decisions is the industrial structure 
of banks that participate in the payments system. Industrial 
structure can differ for a number of reasons, many of which 
may be exogenous to banks’ activities in the payments system. 
Such differences can result in varying costs of liquidity. In 
addition, the number of banks in a payments system—whether 
10 or 1,000—can influence the likelihood of successful 
coordination of payments.
A number of studies provide empirical evidence on liquidity 
costs. McAndrews and Rajan (2000) document the payment 
and value timing distributions on the Fedwire funds service. 
McAndrews and Potter (2002) show the effects of the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001, on the timing of payments over 
Fedwire. Mills and Nesmith (2008) find that the charging of 
overdraft fees on Fedwire in 1994 sped up the settlement of 
payments on the securities service but did not change the timing 
of payments on the funds service. Heller, Nellen, and Strum 
(2000) show that the introduction of intraday credit to banks 
in the Swiss Interbank Clearing system dramatically shifted 
the value time distribution of payments to earlier in the day. 
McAndrews (2006) finds that high-payment-value days lead to 
later value-weighted average payment value settlement times on 
Fedwire, consistent with a model of higher shadow prices of 
liquidity on high-payment-value days. Becher, Galbiati, and 
Tudela (2008), examining the timing of sterling payments on 
the Clearing House Automated Payment System (CHAPS), find 
that CHAPS has a less pronounced late-in-the-day peak than 
the Fedwire funds service does. The divergent patterns in 
Fedwire and CHAPS are broadly consistent with the models 
of Bech and Garratt (2003) and Bech (2008), but they also 
likely reflect the imposition and maintenance of throughput 
guidelines by CHAPS participants; the guidelines govern the 
percentage of value to be submitted at different times during the 
day. Finally, several papers use simulations to examine the 
trade-off between liquidity costs and delays in theoretical 
payments systems, including Koponen and Soramäki (2005) 
and Leinonen and Soramäki (2005).
3. Descriptive Analysis
Here we analyze payment and value time distributions on the 
Fedwire funds service. We focus on the number and value of 
payments transferred during a minute and contrast the time 
series of these variables in 1998 and 2006. Our work is purely 
descriptive; in the next section, we conduct regression analysis 
exploring the reasons behind the changes observed.
For our examination, we remove all payments to or from the 
settlement institutions: CHIPS, CLS Bank, and the Depository 
Trust Company (DTC). This allows us to focus on the non-
settlement institutions’ funds transfers on Fedwire, as these are 
subject to the strategic decisions of the sending party. Notably, 
this approach excludes the early-morning activity of CHIPS 
and CLS Bank.
An observed late-day distribution of 
payments could occur either because 
banks delay payments or because banks 
receive payment instructions late in 
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Chart 1
Fedwire Funds Payment Time Distribution, 1998 and 2006
Percentage of daily number of payments
0.25
Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of New York; authors’ calculations.
Notes: The chart shows the mean daily percentage of total payments settled in each minute. Values exclude payments associated with CHIPS, 
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3.1 General Pattern in the Timing of Payments
Charts 1 and 2, respectively, present the probability distri-
bution functions for the percentage of the daily number of 
transfers and the percentage of daily value settled. Each point 
on Chart 1 (Chart 2) represents the average number (value) 
of payments transferred during that minute expressed as a 
percentage of the total number (value) of payments transferred 
that day. The charts show that the timing of Fedwire payments 
exhibits a general pattern that remained essentially stable 
between 1998 and 2006, whereby both the number and value of 
payments peaked in the late afternoon. We start by describing 
this general pattern.
Chart 1 shows that relatively few payments are sent before 
08:00, with the notable exception of the period following the 
opening of Fedwire (00:30 in 1998 and 21:00 in 2006), when 
many banks submit their CHIPS prefunding payments (recall 
that funds transfers to or from CHIPS and to or from CLS Bank 
are excluded from our measure of funds transfers in these 
charts). In the ten-minute period beginning at 08:30, there is a 
large spike in payment activity in 1998 and in 2006. The spike 
partially results from increases in bank balances attributable to 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s making principal and 
interest payments on behalf of the U.S. Treasury and 
government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) as well as customer 
activity associated with the opening of the Fedwire securities 
service. After 08:30, payment volume initially declines, then 
steadily rises to a plateau between 15:00 and 16:00, when it 
reaches a level of activity similar to that of the 08:30 period. 
After 16:00, payment volume drops sharply until the close 
of Fedwire.
The value of payments settled also peaks in the late 
afternoon, but the peak is both sharper and later than that of 
the volume of payments (Chart 2). Like volume, value settled 
is low during the early-morning hours and it rises to its peak 
around the time DTC and CHIPS close. Note that while 
payment volume is falling after 16:00, payment value is rising. 
This is the result of the concentration of large-value payments 
late in the day. Finally, although discernible, the peaks around 
the opening of Fedwire and at 08:30 are proportionally much 
lower for the value of payments than for the volume of 
payments.
The timing of Fedwire payments exhibits 
a general pattern that remained essentially 
stable between 1998 and 2006, whereby 
both the number and value of payments 
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Chart 2
Fedwire Funds Value Time Distribution, 1998 and 2006
Percentage of daily value of payments
0.75
Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of New York; authors’ calculations.
Notes: The chart shows the mean daily percentage of total payments settled in each minute. Values exclude payments associated with CHIPS, 









3.2 Changes in the Distribution of Value
A comparison of Charts 1 and 2 indicates that the value time 
distribution has changed much more than the volume time 
distribution. Therefore, we now focus on the evolution of the 
value time distribution. Table 1 presents the times at which the 
deciles of payment value settled on average in 1998 and 2006. 
The earliest and latest deciles—10, 20, and 100—settled earlier 
in 2006 than in 1998. The remaining deciles—30-90—moved 
to later-day settlement. Additionally, there is decreased 
variability in the settlement time of deciles 40-100, implying 
much more regularity in the later part of the value time 
distribution.
To understand the significance of these value shifts, we 
calculate the time at which each percentile of daily value settles 
for each day in 1998 and 2006. Then, for each percentile, we 
compare the distributions of the samples collected in 1998 and 
2006 nonparametrically using the Mann-Whitney two-sample 
statistic. Our results appear in Chart 3. As the x-axis indicates, 
each of the 100 points corresponds to a percentile, moving left 
to right from percentile 1 to percentile 100. The y-axis 
corresponds to the number of minutes that must be added to 
or subtracted from the 2006 sample until the Mann-Whitney 
test is insignificant at the 5 percent level. For instance, the first 
point at the bottom of Chart 3 indicates that the first percentile 
in 2006 settled significantly earlier than the first percentile in 
1998 by at least 7 minutes and 30 seconds. However, a point on 
the origin line indicates that the corresponding percentile 
cannot be distinguished statistically between the two samples.
Percentiles 1-24 are located below the origin axis, indicating 
that the lower percentiles of value were transferred earlier in the 
day in 2006 relative to 1998. Percentiles 27-95 lay above the 
origin line, indicating that most of the value distribution shifted 
to later in the day between 1998 and 2006. However, the points 
Table 1









10 11:15:21 00:09:34 10:37:37 00:15:22 -37.7
20 12:58:33 00:14:09 12:44:10 00:18:02 -14.4
30 14:24:21 00:15:41 14:33:51 00:17:60 9.5
40 15:19:59 00:14:58 15:38:09 00:13:25 18.2
50 15:59:29 00:14:33 16:15:04 00:10:44 15.6
60 16:28:18 00:12:09 16:37:29 00:08:22 9.2
70 16:46:05 00:10:46 16:58:58 00:07:09 12.9
80 17:02:47 00:10:43 17:14:06 00:04:20 11.3
90 17:26:25 00:11:27 17:30:12 00:03:53 3.8
100 18:37:28 00:23:05 18:31:14 00:07:15 -6.2
Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of New York; authors’ calculations.88 Changes in the Timing Distribution 
Chart 3
Mann-Whitney U Test on Percentiles of Value Time, 1998 to 2006
Minutes difference between 2006 and 1998
6
Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of New York; authors’ calculations.
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corresponding to the last percentiles, 96-99, are located below 
the origin line. It appears that the last percentiles of value were 
transferred later in the day in 1998. This result may be explained 
by a decline in the number and length of extensions since 1998.
The probability density function of the value time 
distributions in 1998 and 2006 is presented in Chart 2. Observe 
first that the supports of the 1998 and 2006 distributions in the 
chart have different lower bounds. Indeed, Fedwire operating 
hours were expanded when the opening hour was moved from 
00:30 to 21:00 on May 17, 2004. Chart 2 shows that the change 
in the opening hour did not dramatically affect the distribution 
of value settled prior to 07:00. After 07:00, the two distributions 
intersect several times, suggesting no clear pattern to how 
the timing of payments changed between 1998 and 2006. We 
identify five distinctive features from our analysis of Chart 2:
1. The distribution of value settled becomes more 
concentrated. In particular, observe that the magnitude 
of the highest peak is greater in 2006 than in 1998. To 
confirm this observation, we plot in Chart 4 the evolution 
of the kurtosis of the payment value distribution. The 
chart shows a clear positive time trend between 1998 
and 2006. If we interpret the kurtosis as a measure of 
peakedness, Chart 4 confirms that the distribution of 
value settled has become more concentrated over time. 
This result is important from a policy perspective, as it 
reflects a greater coordination in the timing of payments 
among Fedwire participants. A by-product of the greater 
coordination of payment activity, the amount of value 
transferred on Fedwire that is offsetting within a ten-
minute period rose significantly, from 56 percent in 1998 
to 58 percent in 2006. As the amount of offsetting 
payments rises, banks enjoy greater economy in the 
use of liquidity.
2. The highest peak of the distribution shifts to a later time, 
from around 16:48 in 1998 to around 17:11 in 2006. In 
other words, the minute during which most of the daily 
value is transferred is now twenty-three minutes closer to 
closing time. Chart 5 shows the distribution of value 
settled by time for each year between 1998 and 2006. It is 
clear from the chart that the highest peak moved to a later 
time between 1999 and 2000, and it was not a gradual 
move. The mean daily time of the top ten contiguous 
minutes of Fedwire funds value moved twenty minutes 
later, from 16:48 to 17:08, and the median daily time 
moved twenty-three minutes later, from 16:48 to 17:11, 
supporting the presence of a significant shift toward a 
later time in the peak of the distribution.3
3 This difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level for the Mann-
Whitney two-sample statistic.
The highest peak of the distribution shifts 
to a later time, from around 16:48 in 1998 
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Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of New York; authors’ calculations.
Notes: Kurtosis is the excess kurtosis. A twenty-one-day centered moving average is used. Values exclude payments associated with CHIPS, CLS Bank, 
DTC, and principal and interest payment funding. GSE is government-sponsored enterprise.
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Chart 5
Fedwire Funds Value Time Distribution by Year
Percentage of total daily value
Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of New York; authors’ calculations.
Notes: The panels show the mean daily percentage of total payment value settled in each minute. Values exclude payments associated with CHIPS, 
CLS Bank, DTC, and principal and interest payment funding.
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3. At the time of highest activity (between 16:00 and 17:30), 
the 2006 distribution exhibits three distinct peaks: two of 
comparable magnitude at precisely 16:30 and 17:00 and 
the third (the sharpest) at around 17:11. By comparison, 
the 1998 distribution possesses only two peaks: the 
sharpest at around 16:45 and a slightly smaller peak at 
16:30. An analysis of the distribution of value settled for 
each year between 1998 and 2006 indicates that: 1) the 
16:30 peak is present every year throughout the sample 
period; 2) as documented above, the highest peak moved 
from 16:48 to 17:11 between 1999 and 2000; and 3) the 
emergence of the 17:00 peak can be traced to 2004.
4. The 1998 distribution of value settled exhibits regular 
clock effects. Indeed, as indicated by the equidistant spikes 
in the 1998 probability distribution in Chart 2, there 
seems to be a flurry of activity every half-hour on the half-
hour between 11:30 and 16:30. In contrast, these clock 
effects are not as discernible in the 2006 distribution. An 
analysis of the distribution of value settled for each year 
between 1998 and 2006 indicates that the clock effects 
gradually dissipate until they virtually disappear in 2002. 
We have not been able to identify what causes these clock 
effects and why they have faded away over time. In 
particular, it is unclear whether the effects are attributable 
to technological factors, the behavior of Fedwire 
participants, or institutional constraints.
5. The 2006 distribution exhibits a higher amount of 
activity at precisely 08:00 and 08:30. An analysis of the 
distribution of value settled for each year between 1998 
and 2006 indicates that the 08:30 peak increased gradually 
over time, while the 08:00 peak is present only in 2006. 
The 08:00 peak is likely associated with the Federal 
Reserve’s July 2006 change to its Payments System Risk 
Policy regarding GSEs, while the 08:30 peak is likely 
associated with the increased importance of the securities 
markets and the opening of the Fedwire securities 
service at 08:30.
We conclude this section with an analysis of Chart 6, in 
which the deciles of daily value settled are presented as a time 
series spanning the period from September 1997 to February 
2007. The chart identifies several discrete events that may have 
affected the timing of Fedwire payments: changes in operating 
hours, changes in CHIPS operations, changes in CLS Bank 
operations, and changes in the Federal Reserve’s Payments 
System Risk Policy regarding GSEs. Chart 6 provides a slightly 
different perspective on how the timing of payments evolved 
over time. Five points in particular are worth noting:
1. The deciles exhibit different trends. The first two deciles 
show a negative trend while the deciles between 
40 percent and 90 percent indicate a slightly positive 
trend. These results are consistent with the dual shift we 
identified earlier when comparing the value of payments 
in 2006 and 1998. Indeed, we found that in 2006 the value 
settled moved toward earlier payments at the beginning 
of the day and toward later payments later in the day.
10:00
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Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of New York; authors’ calculations.
Notes: A twenty-one-day centered moving average is used. Values exclude payments associated with CHIPS, CLS Bank, DTC, and principal 
and interest payment funding. GSE is government-sponsored enterprise. 
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2. The first four deciles are not grouped together as much 
as the five deciles between 50 percent and 90 percent are. 
This observation is consistent with the shape of the 
payment value time distribution in Chart 2, which is 
highly concentrated toward the end of the day.
3. After 2004, the 100th percentile rarely exceeds the 18:30 
closing time, indicating that extensions of Fedwire 
operating hours occur less frequently.
4. The deciles exhibit various peaks and valleys. The reasons 
for some of these peaks and valleys are clear, such as 
September 11, 2001, which led to later payments. Others 
are not as obvious.
5. The events documented in Chart 6 do not have a clear 
effect on the evolution of the times at which the various 
deciles of payment value settle. In particular, it is difficult 
to conclude unambiguously from the chart whether 
trends in the percentiles of value can be imputed directly 
to any one of these events. In the next section, we conduct 
a regression analysis to disentangle the effects of various 
factors on the timing of payments.
4. Regression Analysis
4.1 Model and Data
Our regression analysis identifies the factors that affected the 
distribution, or at least part of the distribution, of payment 
values. After experimenting with different specifications, we 
settled upon an easily interpretable yet robust model consisting 
of 100 linear regressions, each estimated separately for a given 
percentile of value.4 To address possible serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity problems, we relied on the approach 
developed by Newey and West (1987) to correct the estimated 
standard errors.5 Finally, we conducted various diagnostic tests 
4 We recognize that there may be better specifications as well as more efficient 
inference techniques for analyzing the Fedwire value time distribution. In 
particular, since we do not estimate the joint distribution of all percentiles, we 
are not able to compare statistically point estimates across neighboring 
percentiles. Instead, we contrast only how a variable of interest affects different 
parts of the distribution, such as the low percentiles (corresponding to the 
morning) and the high percentiles (corresponding to the late afternoon). 
Observe, however, that: 1) our specification does not imply that the times at 
which the percentiles of value settle are independent and 2) if we can assume 
that our system of regression equations has the structure of a Seemingly 
Unrelated Regressions (SURE) model, then there is no loss of efficiency in 
estimating the regressions separately rather than jointly by GLS, since the 
explanatory variables are the same in each percentile regression.
5 Note that we also estimated the model with lagged (up to ten lags) dependent 
variables. The results remain virtually unchanged and the differences are 
strongly insignificant.
and compared the results of several alternative specifications to 
ensure that our results are robust.
Our sample consists of daily observations for virtually every 
business day between March 1998 and November 2006.6 In a 
given regression, the dependent variable is defined as the time 
at which the corresponding percentile of value settled on a 
specific day, which we measure in the number of seconds since 
the day’s Fedwire opening. The same set of explanatory 
variables is used in each of the 100 regressions. A formal 
definition of these variables as well as their sources can be 
found in Appendix A. Drawing on the literature we reviewed 
earlier, we include a number of potentially relevant variables in 
our analysis, which we organize into five categories: value and 
volume, Federal Reserve policies and operations, settlement 
system activities, other control variables, and calendar effects. 
Summary statistics for the independent variables are presented 
in Table 2.
Value and Volume
The value as well as the number, or volume, of payments 
transferred over Fedwire may play a role in determining when 
Fedwire participants submit payments. To account for these 
effects, we disaggregate the nonsettlement daily value of 
Fedwire funds into four mutually exclusive groups. More 
specifically, we differentiate: 1) the total value transferred by 
banks on behalf of their customers, 2) the total value of 
deliveries of federal funds purchases and sales, 3) the total value 
of federal funds returns (of the prior day’s deliveries), and 
4) the value of all other interbank transfers, thereby consisting 
of payments not included in the groups made on behalf of 
customers or as part of a federal funds purchase, sale, or return. 
All else equal, and controlling in particular for the number of 
Fedwire payments, we observe that a higher value of transfers 
should result in a higher demand for daylight credit, which 
would lead to a higher shadow cost of liquidity. As a result, 
one may anticipate that higher values of payments lead to later 
settlement of payments.
6 We are missing data for the following dates: April 1, 1997; December 22-24, 
1997; March 1-3, 1999; April 20-22, 1999; October 14-15, 1999; October 18, 
1999; and November 9, 1999.
Our regression analysis identifies the 
factors that affected the distribution, 
or at least part of the distribution, 
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As the size of payments varies greatly, we also include in 
the regressions the share of daily value consisting of individual 
payments in excess of $10 million in value. We chose 
$10 million as a threshold because it is quite close to the top 
1 percent of individual payments when ranked by value. We 
hypothesize that a large proportion of high-value payments 
would cause a greater need for daylight credit, resulting in 
higher shadow costs of liquidity and later payments.
Finally, we control for the number of payments.7 After we 
hold the values of payments constant, an increase in volume 
results in smaller individual payments on average. Therefore, 
one may expect that higher volume would be associated with 
faster Fedwire settlement, as smaller individual payments are 
less likely to require drawing in daylight credit. An alternative 
hypothesis is that a higher volume of transfers places higher 
operational demands on banks to check the credit lines of 
customers and other processes associated with submission 
of payments to Fedwire, and it could therefore result in later 
settlement.
Federal Reserve Policies and Operations
The Federal Reserve Banks offer many Fedwire participants 
access to daylight overdrafts for a fee and subject to upper 
limits, as described in the Federal Reserve’s Payments System 
7 Note that although the value and volume variables drift during the sample 
period, we find no evidence suggesting that they may be nonstationary. More 
specifically, after conducting a series of Dickey-Fuller tests (with ten lags) and 
Phillips-Perron unit-root tests, we rejected the nonstationary hypothesis at the 
1 percent significance level.
Risk Policy. These upper limits on the amount of daylight 
overdrafts that can be extended to a bank participant are called 
net debit caps. We include as a dummy variable the date of the 
liberalization of net debit caps that occurred on February 21, 
2002, which allowed foreign banking organizations to modify 
the net debit cap calculation for U.S. branches and agencies of 
foreign banks (we call that variable the Foreign Capital 
Equivalency Policy). That change resulted in a one-time 
increase of approximately 10 percent in the aggregate net debit 
caps of Fedwire participants. We argue that this change in 
policy lowered the costs of liquidity for these banks and should 
result in earlier settlement of payments. Because the policy 
change was applied primarily to foreign banks—many of which 
participate in CHIPS and CLS Bank, which have early-in-the-
day activity—we expect this faster settlement to affect mainly 
the lowest percentiles of Fedwire activity.
Another change in the Payments System Risk Policy, which 
occurred on July 20, 2006, restricted GSEs and certain 
international organizations from incurring daylight overdrafts. 
In general, this change represents a restriction of access to 
daylight credit, and we would expect it to correspond to an 
increase in liquidity costs. Thus, we hypothesize that this 
change, which we capture with a dummy variable, would result 
in slower payment settlement. Not all GSEs are exactly 
comparable, however. In particular, a distinctive feature of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is their payment of principal 
and interest on the 15th and the 25th of each month (or on 
dates close to the 15th and 25th when they fall on weekends or 
banking holidays). We therefore include an additional dummy 
variable to measure whether the change in policy affects the 
Table 2
Summary Statistics of Independent Variables
Variable Mean Median Standard Deviation Minimum  Maximum
Target federal funds rate (percent) 3.61 4.00 1.88 1.00 6.50
Operating hour extension (minutes) 00:04:05 00:00:00 00:19:06 00:00:00 05:16:00
Interbank payment value (billions of dollars) 487.08 476.19 75.40 148.79 865.82
Customer payment value (billions of dollars) 610.25 585.75 144.39 152.27 1334.25
Federal funds deliveries (billions of dollars) 250.83 257.65 65.70 0.92 472.64
Federal funds returns (billions of dollars) 250.09 257.84 64.21 0.92 432.61
Payments greater than or equal to $10 million 0.908 0.909 0.011 0.853 0.934
Number of payments (thousands) 465.237 453.817 79.101 186.895 904.726
Federal funds deviation -0.01 0.00 0.13 -1.56 1.81
HHI of Fedwire value 529.8 516.5 107.0 220.2 795.3
Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of New York; authors’ calculations.
Notes: Payments greater than or equal to $10 million is defined as the fraction of daily value from payments greater than or equal to $10 million, excluding 
CHIPS, CLS Bank, DTC, and principal and interest funding payments. HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index, a measure of the concentration of payment 
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timing of Fedwire payments differently on these specific dates. 
We do not have an unambiguous prediction about the effect of 
this policy change on the timing distribution. On the one hand, 
the change may generate more delays, as they represent a 
restriction on access to liquidity; on the other hand, it may 
accelerate Fedwire payments, because GSEs must have funds 
delivered to them prior to releasing their principal and interest 
payments.
We include a dummy variable for all dates after the Federal 
Reserve extended, in May 2004, the opening hours of Fedwire 
to 21:30. We contend that this change may increase the 
submission of early-morning payments to Fedwire. 
Occasionally, the Federal Reserve Banks decide to extend the 
hours of Fedwire operation because of significant operational 
problems of a participant or the system. As such, we include 
a variable that measures the duration of the extension in 
minutes. We hypothesize that extensions may increase 
settlement risk and uncertainty and are associated with later 
payments—especially for the final few percentiles of payment 
value—and therefore they slow the settlement of the later 
percentiles of funds transfers. Finally, we include the target fed 
funds rate as a variable to control for any effect that monetary 
policy decisions might have on the timing of payments.
Settlement System Activities
Every day, most financial institutions are active simultaneously 
in a number of markets and payments systems—in particular, 
in the settlement systems CLS Bank, CHIPS, and DTC. (See 
Appendix B for a description of these systems.) This activity 
may affect the liquidity available to these participants at a given 
time during the day, which in turn may influence the time at 
which Fedwire participants decide to submit payments. To 
control for the influence of settlement system activity on the 
timing of Fedwire payments, we include a dummy variable for 
the dates after which CLS Bank began operation. Because CLS 
Bank operates early in the day in the United States, we reason 
that it may quicken the settlement of Fedwire payments 
submitted in the morning.
We also include variables measuring the times at which 
CHIPS and DTC conduct their late-afternoon settlements.8 
We hypothesize that the times of these settlement systems are 
associated with decreased uncertainty and with rapid 
redistribution of balances in various banks’ accounts after these 
settlements are complete. Because of these effects, these times 
can also act as focal points for the settlement of other Fedwire 
8 CLS Bank settles at multiple times in the early morning; because CLS Bank 
operates so early and its settlement time is so diffuse and therefore difficult to 
characterize, we do not include a settlement time variable for it.
payments (we discuss these points in more detail below). We 
conjecture that the time of these settlements will positively 
influence the timing of Fedwire payments: as their times move, 
so will the timing of Fedwire payments.
In addition to time variables associated with CHIPS, DTC, 
and CLS Bank, we include the value of U.S. dollar settlements 
conducted each day through CLS Bank, the values of the initial 
and final prefunding values in CHIPS, and the net-net 
settlement values in DTC. In our view, an increase in values 
settled through the settlement systems would increase demand 
for daylight credit, increasing its shadow cost, and result in 
later settlement times.
Other Control Variables
We include both a constant and a time trend in our regression. 
The time trend is meant to control for trends, such as 
technological change, other than those captured by other 
covariates (for example, the volume and values of payments). 
In addition, we include the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index 
(HHI) of payment market shares, a measure of the 
concentration of payment activity among banks. We expect 
this variable to control for industry mergers and other changes 
in the pattern of payments between banks. As discussed earlier, 
industrial structure can affect payment timing in a number of 
ways not fully examined in the literature. A more concentrated 
industrial structure might be able to coordinate payments 
more easily, but at either an earlier or later time of day. A more 
concentrated structure could result in more payment value 
being transferred by the larger bank that is more likely to have 
exceeded its deductible portion of the overdraft fee schedule, 
and therefore is more likely to economize liquidity actively. 
As a result, a greater concentration in industrial structure in 
the payment market could lead to later settlement. Finally, we 
include the interest rate spread between the effective federal 
funds rate and the target federal funds rate. We reason that 
when this spread is high, the net demand for end-of-day 
[Our analysis includes] variables 
measuring the times at which CHIPS 
and DTC conduct their late-afternoon 
settlements . . . . These times can also 
act as focal points for the settlement 
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balances is relatively high, which we would expect to be 
associated with later payment timing.
Calendar Effects
There are many predictable differences in payment activity 
across the days of the week and over the year. For example, 
Mondays predictably have higher volume than Fridays on 
average; days at the beginning of the month are likewise 
expected to be high value. To control for these effects on the 
timing of Fedwire payments, we include a number of dummy 
variables for various calendar effects. Included are dummies 
for the days of the week, the days preceding and following 
holidays, the first of the month, the last day of the quarter, the 
last day of the year and, separately, the last five days of the year. 
In addition, we include dummies for days on which the New 
York Stock Exchange is closed and, separately, days on which it 
closes early. Dummies are also included for each of the final five 
days of the reserve maintenance period (the day-of-week 
dummy captures both the effect of the day of the week and the 
effect of the first five days of the reserve maintenance period); 
we include that variable in case the reserve maintenance period 
influences payment activity. Finally, we include a separate 
dummy for the two-week period including and following 
September 11, 2001. During that period, Fedwire operating 
hours were regularly extended and were expected to experience 
later activity than normal.
Before analyzing our regression results, we emphasize one 
point. The variables described above may be expected to affect 
some parts, but not necessarily all, of the timing distribution. 
For instance, CLS Bank value may be considered likely to affect 
the payment distribution early in the day, but it may not 
necessarily have a lasting effect on the final percentiles of the 
distribution. Conversely, CHIPS final payout value may be 
considered likely to affect only the upper tail of the value 
distribution.
Results
To streamline our analysis, we present our estimation results 
graphically in Charts 7-11. We start by providing information 
about the interpretation of each chart. The x-axes of each chart 
display two scales. The bottom scale represents the percentile 
of value, or equivalently the regression number, moving from 
1 to 100. The top scale represents the average time in 2006 at 
which the corresponding percentile settled during the day. 
The afternoon peak of the Fedwire value time distribution is 
evident when comparing these two scales. 12:00, which is fifteen 
hours after the opening of Fedwire, is only the 15th percentile of 
value time. By comparison, the hour between 16:00 and 17:00 
includes more than twenty percentiles. Each chart corresponds 
to an explanatory variable; for instance, Chart 7.1 corresponds 
to interbank payment value. Each chart plots twenty points 
indicating the point estimate of the coefficient for that variable 
in the corresponding linear regression. As indicated in the chart 
notes, the color of the point identifies the level of statistical 
significance of the point estimate. On each side of a point 
estimate, we add a band representing the 95 percent confidence 
interval for this point estimate. Finally, we plot in Chart 12 the 
adjusted R2 for each regression.
In terms of interpretation, a parameter significantly 
greater (lower) than zero in a regression for a given percentile 
indicates that the marginal effect of the corresponding 
explanatory variable delays (accelerates) the time at which 
that percentile settles.
In these charts, the results of multiple percentiles are shown 
on the same scale. This gives a full sense of each variable’s effect 
on the timing of payments across the entire day. However, as 
we mentioned, comparisons between percentiles could be 
misleading and may overstate the economic effect of variables 
in the middle percentiles. Delaying a payment by the same 
amount of time becomes more costly as the end of the day 
approaches, when there is less time left to settle all remaining 
payments. For example, five minutes of delay at 17:30, when 
there is only one hour of the business day left, can be 
considered a larger economic effect than five minutes 
of delay at 12:00. 
Value and Volume
The parameters associated with the value of interbank 
payments settled over Fedwire are significant and greater than 
zero for virtually all percentiles (Chart 7.1). In other words, it 
appears that more interbank transfers over Fedwire tend to 
slow down the settlement of payments generally throughout 
the day. This result is consistent with the argument that banks 
have an incentive to delay their interbank payments, which are 
of high average value and may incur little delay cost because no 
customer may be demanding early settlement because of the 
cost of daylight credit.
In contrast, the parameters corresponding to the total value 
transferred by banks on behalf of their customers over Fedwire 
are negative and significant for all percentiles below 85 percent, 
that is, for payments submitted before 17:45 on average in 2006 
(Chart 7.2). Fedwire payments therefore seem to settle earlier, 
when the value of transactions transferred by banks’ customers 
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with interbank transfers, banks face a higher delay cost when 
acting on customers’ requests for payments. In particular, 
banks may be asked by their customers to execute their 
transfers by a certain time.
The results suggest that both forms of federal funds activity 
tend to delay the timing of Fedwire payments. Indeed, the 
significant parameters in Charts 7.3 and 7.4 are systematically 
greater than zero. Observe, however, that federal funds returns 
appear to have a slightly larger effect earlier in the day, while the 
effect of federal funds deliveries persists throughout the day. 
These results may be considered surprising since both types 
of activities tend to occur later in the day. We conjecture that 
federal funds purchases and sales also capture the demand for 
overnight credit. This would therefore explain why higher 
federal funds deliveries are associated with delayed Fedwire 
payments throughout the day. Likewise, it is possible that 
banks expecting a return of federal funds may tend to delay 
their Fedwire payments in the morning until their accounts 
have been credited.
We now turn to the effect of the number of Fedwire 
payments transferred in a day. Virtually all parameters in 
Chart 7.6 are positive and significant for percentiles up to 
80 percent, or equivalently for payments transferred before 
17:45 on average in 2006. In other words, all else equal, an 
increase in the number of Fedwire transfers results in delayed 
payments for most of the day. This result seems to contradict 
our hypothesis that a greater number of transfers may expedite 
Fedwire payments, as it implies lower average size payments 
once we control for the total value transferred. Instead, the 
result possibly points toward greater operational costs, 
whereby banks must delay payments because it takes more 
time to process a greater number of payments.
Chart 7
Regressions of Fedwire Funds Value Time Percentiles
Value and Volume
Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of New York; authors’ calculations.
Notes: The upper x-axis displays the mean 2006 time for selected percentiles. The y-axis displays the value of the coefficient. The band represents 
the 95 percent confidence interval for the point estimates. We use independent ordinary least squares regressions with Newey-West standard 
errors (maximum lag = 10) for the 2nd to 99th percentiles of value. The color of the point indicates the significance of the coefficient: 
blue = 1 percent, light blue = 5 percent, dark gray = insignificant. There are 2,200 observations for each regression.   
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All else equal, an increase in the number 
of Fedwire transfers results in delayed 
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Chart 8
Regressions of Fedwire Funds Value Time Percentiles
Federal Reserve Policies and Operations
Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of New York; authors’ calculations.
Notes: The upper x-axis displays the mean 2006 time for selected percentiles. The y-axis displays the value of the coefficient. The band represents 
the 95 percent confidence interval for the point estimates. We use independent ordinary least squares regressions with Newey-West standard errors 
(maximum lag = 10) for the 2nd to 99th percentiles of value. The color of the point indicates the significance of the coefficient: blue = 1 percent, 
light blue = 5 percent, dark gray = insignificant.  There are 2,200 observations for each regression. GSE is government-sponsored enterprise; 
MBS is mortgage-backed securities; P&I is principal and interest.   
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The size of individual payments, however, is not completely 
neutral. Indeed, we find that the fraction of individual payments 
exceeding $10 million affects the timing of payments for 
percentiles up to 65 percent (Chart 7.5). In other words, large 
individual transfers delay payments submitted before 16:45 on 
average in 2006. This result does not unambiguously support our 
view that large individual payments lead to delayed settlement 
because they increase the likelihood of daylight overdrafts. We 
argue that our finding of no such delays after 16:45 may be 
explained by the fact that opportunities for multilateral netting 
are greater at the peak of Fedwire activity. As a result, banks may 
be less likely to delay large individual payments at the end of the 
day, as the risk of daylight overdraft decreases.
Federal Reserve Policies and Operations
The July 1, 2006, modifications to the Federal Reserve’s 
Payments System Risk Policy with regard to GSEs seem to have 
contributed to the delays in payments submitted after 15:00 
on average in 2006 (Chart 8.2). Indeed, most estimated 
parameters for percentiles above 35 percent are significant and 
greater than zero. This result is therefore consistent with our 
hypothesis that the removal of access to intraday credit by GSEs 
and international organizations resulted in a shift toward later 
Fedwire payments. It is also consistent with the observation 
that the Federal Home Loan Banks decided to delay settlement 
of their principal and interest payments from 08:30 to 
approximately 14:00 after the implementation of the policy 
(but the delay effects persist throughout most of the remainder 
of the day).
As Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are somewhat distinct from 
other GSEs, we also test whether the change in the Payments 
System Risk Policy had a specific effect on the 15th and 25th of 
the month, dates on which these two institutions make their 
principal and interest payments. Controlling for these specific 
dates over our entire sample period (see our discussion below) 
as well as for the policy change for all days following its 
implementation, we find that the timing of Fedwire payments 
shifted to earlier in the morning, but remained unchanged in 
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are significant and negative (Chart 8.3). This result may be 
explained by a combination of two factors. First, compared 
with other GSEs, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac did not delay 
markedly their payments of principal and interest after July 1, 
2006. Second, after the policy change, these two GSEs found 
ways to have funds delivered to them earlier in the morning 
than they did prior to the change, in order to avoid having to 
draw on daylight overdrafts.
In another significant change to the Payments System Risk 
Policy, the February 21, 2002, Foreign Capital Equivalency 
Policy change increased the net debit cap of foreign banking 
organizations. We hypothesize that because foreign banking 
organizations conduct a larger percentage of their payments in 
the early Fedwire operating hours (from 21:00 to 08:00), which 
overlap with the operating hours of European and Asian 
markets, this change would affect the low percentiles of the 
Fedwire value time distribution. Chart 8.1 shows that the 
estimated parameters for percentiles below 20 percent are 
significant and negative, indicating that the change in Federal 
Reserve policies accelerated the submission of Fedwire 
payments in the morning. This result is therefore consistent 
with our prediction that the increase in net debit caps benefited 
mostly foreign banks submitting payments early in the 
morning, partly because of their active participation in CHIPS 
and CLS Bank.
We also find that the parameters associated with the 
duration of occasional extensions of Fedwire opening hours 
are significant and positive for most percentiles throughout 
the day. Observe also that the magnitude of the effect is 
significantly larger as the official closing time nears (that is, 
after 17:30). In other words, and in line with intuition, the 
duration of an extension is in general positively correlated 
with delays in the timing of payments, and it is particularly 
powerful for explaining delays at the end of the day.9
Finally, and somewhat surprisingly, our regression results 
in Chart 8.4 suggest that payments submitted in the morning 
were settled significantly later, not sooner, after Fedwire 
extended its opening hours from 00:30 to 21:00.
Settlement System Activities
We find no evidence supporting the hypothesis that the 
opening of CLS Bank had an effect on the timing of payments 
submitted through Fedwire (again, recall that payments to and 
from CLS Bank itself are removed from our measures). Indeed, 
all but a small number of estimated parameters associated with 
either the dummy variable capturing the opening date of CLS 
9 We find no indication that the occasional extensions of Fedwire operations 
may be endogenous. In other words, this variable may be considered as 
capturing only technical failure in Fedwire operations.
Bank (Chart 9.8) or the variable capturing the value of pay-
ments exchanged over CLS Bank (Chart 9.7) are insignificant. 
Therefore, the conjecture that the creation of CLS Bank may 
have helped speed up other Fedwire payments because it settles 
early in the day turned out to be unfounded.
In contrast, the other two settlement systems—CHIPS and 
DTC—appear to play major roles in shaping the value time 
distribution of Fedwire funds transfers, especially toward the 
end of the day. In particular, we identify significant delays in 
Fedwire payments submitted late in the afternoon (between 
16:15 and 17:15 on average in 2006) on days DTC settles later. 
Indeed, the point estimates in Chart 9.6 are significantly greater 
than zero in the regressions conducted for the percentiles 
55 percent to 85 percent. As we discuss in the next section, this 
result is particularly relevant, as DTC settlement typically 
occurs near the time of highest Fedwire activity.
Likewise, we find that the time of CHIPS settlement plays 
a significant role in explaining the upper tail of the value time 
distribution of Fedwire payments. Indeed, the estimations 
reported in Chart 9.1 suggest a strong positive effect, highly 
concentrated around the 75th percentile, which is very close to 
the time at which the highest peak of Fedwire activity occurs in 
2006 (Chart 2). As we explore in greater detail in the next 
section, the emergence of the after-17:00 peak in Fedwire value 
transferred coincides with the change in CHIPS settlement 
time. In other words, the end-of-day shift in the timing of 
payments toward a later time may be traced in large part to 
the change in the timing of CHIPS settlement. Our regression 
results suggest that the January 2000 change in the timing of 
CHIPS settlement led to later settlement of the 65th-95th 
percentiles of Fedwire value.
In contrast with the effects of the change in CHIPS 
settlement time, the change in the CHIPS settlement 
mechanism (to provide intraday finality of payments made via 
CHIPS) quickened the settlement of Fedwire payments 
throughout most of the day. Most of the estimated parameters 
in Chart 9.2 are significant and negative. This result may point 
to a consequence that the new CHIPS settlement mechanism 
has on customers: It may enable banks to credit their customers 
for payments made on CHIPS earlier in the day than was the 
practice before January 22, 2001. As a result of this earlier 
CHIPS and DTC appear to play major 
roles in shaping the value time distribution 
of Fedwire funds transfers, especially 
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redistribution of liquidity, banks’ customers may now be able 
to submit other payments over Fedwire earlier.
Less clear is the influence of the variables capturing CHIPS 
and DTC values on the timing of Fedwire payments. For 
instance, we find that large CHIPS final payouts slow Fedwire 
payments at the end of the day (Chart 9.3). This result is not 
consistent with the hypothesis that, by releasing funds after 
it settles, CHIPS may accelerate payments made through 
Fedwire. Instead, it could suggest that CHIPS participants that 
have to make payments to settle their positions may experience 
a temporary liquidity squeeze that leads them to delay their 
Fedwire payments. Alternatively, it may reflect some greater 
uncertainties in banks’ positions on days of high CHIPS 
settlements that cause increased delays of Fedwire payments.
The effect of DTC net-net credits is complicated. Chart 9.5 
shows that larger DTC net-net credits appear to: 1) expedite 
Fedwire payments submitted in the morning (before 13:30), 
2) slow mid-afternoon Fedwire payments (between 15:30 and 
16:30), and 3) have no effect on payments submitted at the end 
of the day (after 16:30). We have no explanation for the first 
result. The second result may be explained by the fact that, 
as the level of activity on DTC increases throughout the day, 
liquidity available to other banks to make Fedwire payments 
is removed. Finally, the third result suggests that at the end 
of the day, the timing of Fedwire payments is affected only by 
the time at which DTC settles, not by the value of DTC net-
net credits.
Other Control Variables
We find that a higher degree of industry concentration, as 
measured by the HHI, slows the transfer of Fedwire payments 
submitted after 12:00 up until the time of highest Fedwire 
activity. Indeed, most of the estimated parameters below the 
75th percentile in Chart 10.2 are positive and significant. One 
Chart 9
Regressions of Fedwire Funds Value Time Percentiles
Settlement Institutions
Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of New York; authors’ calculations.
Notes: The upper x-axis displays the mean 2006 time for selected percentiles. The y-axis displays the value of the coefficient. The band represents 
the 95 percent confidence interval for the point estimates. We use independent ordinary least squares regressions with Newey-West standard errors 
(maximum lag = 10) for the 2nd to 99th percentiles of value. The color of the point indicates the significance of the coefficient: blue = 1 percent, 
light blue = 5 percent, dark gray = insignificant. There are 2,200 observations for each regression.    
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Chart 10
Regressions of Fedwire Funds Value Time Percentiles
Other Control Variables
Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of New York; authors’ calculations.
Notes: The upper x-axis displays the mean 2006 time for selected percentiles. The y-axis displays the value of the coefficient. The band represents 
the 95 percent confidence interval for the point estimates. We use independent ordinary least squares regressions with Newey-West standard errors 
(maximum lag = 10) for the 2nd to 99th percentiles of value. The color of the point indicates the significance of the coefficient: blue = 1 percent, 
light blue = 5 percent, dark gray = insignificant. There are 2,200 observations for each regression. HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index, 
a measure of the concentration of payment activity among banks.   
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hypothesis is that an increase in industry concentration helps 
improve coordination and thereby facilitates the transfer of 
payments around a single point in time. Our finding that 
increased concentration in payment market shares tends to 
slow the settlement of payments might still be consistent 
with increased coordination, but it reflects the fact that 
coordination occurs around a later time of day, possibly 
at the peak of Fedwire activity. 
An alternative hypothesis is that the increased concen-
tration results in greater economization of liquidity by banks. 
The largest banks are more likely to pay positive overdraft 
fees and therefore face a positive marginal cost of liquidity. 
As payment shares move from banks with a zero marginal cost 
of liquidity to those with a positive marginal cost, we would 
expect settlement to occur later in the day. The nature of the 
increase in concentration is consistent with this hypothesis; the 
payment value market share of the top four banks has increased 
by 13 percentage points, while the share of banks ranked 5th 
through 50th has declined by 2 percentage points over the 
period. This shows that payment activity has moved from 
relatively small banks (market shares ranked below 50th), 
which face low marginal overdraft costs, to the largest banks 
(top four), which regularly face a higher positive fee for the 
use of their marginal daylight overdrafts.
The federal funds rate deviation shifts most of the distri-
bution of Fedwire payments earlier (Chart 10.1). This result 
does not support the hypothesis that a positive deviation 
reflects a higher than anticipated demand for intraday 
liquidity by Fedwire participants and therefore would 
be associated with later Fedwire payments. Instead, we 
conjecture that the effect of federal funds deviations could 
be explained by Fedwire participants having an incentive to 
purchase federal funds early if they are trading at a higher 
than anticipated price.
Finally, the time trend is found to be significantly lower than 
zero for most percentiles during the day (Chart 10.3). Before 
we interpret this result, recall that in the descriptive analysis we 
identified a dual adjustment process between 1998 and 2006, 100 Changes in the Timing Distribution 
with a trend toward earlier payments for low percentiles and 
a trend toward later payments for higher percentiles. The 
estimated time trend therefore appears to capture part of the 
first effect, but it is not consistent with the second. In other 
words, the move toward later Fedwire payments at the end of 
the day is explained in our regressions by explanatory variables 
other than the exogenous time trend. In addition, observe that 
the influence of the time trend on the timing of Fedwire 
transfers provides some support for the hypothesis that 
technological improvements, such as in queuing mechanisms 
used at various banks, may have contributed to accelerating 
transfers over Fedwire.
Calendar Effects
We now comment briefly on some of the major calendar 
effects. We find that compared with Thursdays, the timing 
of payments on Mondays (especially in the morning) and 
Tuesdays is delayed (Charts 11.5 and 11.6), but for the most 
part the timing is not significantly different on Wednesdays 
and Fridays, except for a marked end-of-week effect at the close 
of Fedwire on Fridays (Charts 11.7 and 11.8). Controlling for 
the days of the week, we find that the timing of Fedwire 
payments is virtually identical during the second week of the 
maintenance period (Charts 11.9-11.12), except for the 
Monday of the second week (Chart 11.11), when payments 
settle earlier.
Chart 11.1 indicates that Fedwire payments tend to settle 
earlier when Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac make principal and 
interest payments (on the 15th and 25th of the month). This 
effect was anticipated, because these payments are typically 
issued around 08:30, and therefore they provide Fedwire 
participants with an influx of liquidity early in the morning.
In addition, we find that, all else equal, Fedwire payments 
settle earlier: 1) on days when the New York Stock Exchange is 
either closed or closes early (Charts 11.2 and 11.3), 2) on the 
days preceding and following a holiday (Charts 11.14 and 
11.15), 3) on the last days of each quarter (Chart 11.17), and 
4) on the last five days of the year (Chart 11.18). In contrast, 
Fedwire payments tended to be submitted later on the first 
of the month (Chart 11.16) and during the week following 
September 11, 2001 (Chart 11.4).
Finally, observe that the adjusted R2s are generally high 
(Chart 12), indicating that our regression models are able to 
capture a large part of the daily variations in the percentiles of 
Fedwire value. Note also that the adjusted R2s tend to be closer 
to 1 for higher percentiles. This result is consistent with the fact 
that low percentiles, corresponding to payments settled in the 
morning, are in general more volatile from one day to the next.
4.2 Economic Significance
To put our regression results into a more general perspective, 
we conduct two exercises. First, we measure which variables 
can explain a later-than-normal settlement of Fedwire value 
on a given day in 2006. The second exercise measures the 
approximate economic contribution of various factors in 
explaining the shift in late-day payments between 1998 and 
2006. To start, both exercises confine our attention to those 
variables that largely explain the variation in the timing of 
payments submitted after 17:00. This may be considered 
particularly relevant in light of the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System’s 2006 consultation paper, which 
points out that the recent shift of the Fedwire activity peak to 
closer to the end of the day raises some concerns in terms of 
operational problems. Understanding the factors affecting the 
submission of Fedwire payments at the end of the day is 
therefore of particular interest when analyzing potential 
economic costs and benefits of alternative policy options.
In our first exercise, we take out the effect of long-run 
growth in most continuous variables, such as volume and 
value, by removing the trend of each of the continuous 
covariates (those that vary in number or in value over time). 
Next, we measure a small day-to-day variation in the level of 
the variable—namely, a one standard deviation of this adjusted 
variable. We also consider a typical day by setting all calendar 
effects equal to zero and without an extension of Fedwire 
operation. Finally, we ignore the effect of past specific events, 
such as the May 17, 2004, extension of Fedwire operating hours 
and the creation of CLS Bank, as these events are not expected 
to repeat in the variation of activity on Fedwire from one day to 
the next. We then measure the economic significance of all of 
our variables in explaining the timing of payments made on 
Fedwire after 17:00 by multiplying the estimated coefficient by 
the one-standard-deviation change in the variable. 
Surprisingly, we find that only three variables appear to play 
a significant economic role in explaining the timing of Fedwire 
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Chart 11
Regressions of the Fedwire Funds Value Time Percentiles
Calendar Effects
Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of New York; authors’ calculations.
Notes: The upper x-axis displays the mean 2006 time for selected percentiles. The y-axis displays the value of the coefficient. The band represents 
the 95 percent confidence interval for the point estimates. We use independent ordinary least squares regressions with Newey-West standard errors 
(maximum lag = 10) for the 2nd to 99th percentiles of value. The color of the point indicates the significance of the coefficient: blue = 1 percent, 
light blue = 5 percent, dark gray = insignificant. There are 2,200 observations for each regression. MBS is mortgage-backed securities; 
P&I is principal and interest.   
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payments submitted after 17:00 from one day to the next. In 
particular, a typical day-to-day variation in either the value of 
interbank payments or in the number of daily Fedwire transfers 
each delays payments submitted after 17:00 by roughly three 
minutes on average. In addition, we find that an extension of 
CHIPS operating hours delays virtually all payments submitted 
after 17:00 by ten minutes on average. We note that although 
large in magnitude, this effect does not necessarily constitute a 
major risk, as CHIPS extensions are rare in practice, especially 
since CHIPS changed its settlement mechanism (for instance, 
CHIPS extended its hours of operation only once between 
January 2005 and December 2006). Nevertheless, this effect 
does illustrate how significantly the operations of settlement 
institutions are interconnected. To summarize, this first exercise 
indicates that although numerous factors contribute to the shift 
in the time of highest Fedwire activity between 16:30 and 17:00, 
their effects appear to be confined to that period and do not 
spill over near Fedwire’s closing time. This result should be 
reassuring, as it suggests that very few variables have an influence 
on payments submitted after 17:00 on a day-to-day basis.
Our second exercise evaluates the economically significant 
factors that contributed to the shift in the after-17:00 value 
time distribution of Fedwire payments between 1998 and 2006. 
Note, however, that our regression model is not perfectly suited 
to disentangle the respective contribution of each explanatory 
variable from the changes in the timing distribution observed 
during this period. Because most of the covariates varied jointly 
between 1998 and 2006, our model cannot pin down precisely 
the contribution of each explanatory variable to the shift in 
the timing of payments. The results presented here should 
therefore be interpreted as orders of magnitudes rather than 
exact measurements. Again, we are more interested in the 
end-of-day changes and we therefore focus on the changes in 
the 75th percentile, which roughly corresponds to the time of 
highest Fedwire activity in 2006.
Our model predicts that compared with 1998, the 75th 
percentile should have shifted fourteen and a half minutes later 
in 2006. This shift is slightly more than the thirteen minutes 
we actually observe in the data, but it is within two standard 
deviations. If we consider the effect of the time trend as being 
exogenous, we find the following:
1. When combined, the increase in the number and value of 
Fedwire payments between 1998 and 2006 accounted for 
slightly more than 40 percent of this shift in the 75th 
percentile toward a later time.10
2. The change in CHIPS closing time on January 18, 2000, if 
considered an exogenous event, contributed more than
30 percent by itself. This effect, however, is partially offset 
by the modification in the CHIPS settlement mechanism, 
which moved the 75th percentile earlier. As a result, the 
aggregate contribution of CHIPS to the later settlement
10 In this measure, we include all variations between 1998 and 2006 in the 
values of interbank payments, customer payments, and federal fund deliveries 
and returns. We also include the increase in the share of individual payments 
greater than $10 million.
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Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of New York; authors’ calculations.
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10 percent.
3. Finally, the last major contributor to the shift of the 75th 
percentile toward a later time is the higher concentration 
of payment activity among banks. We find that between 
1998 and 2006, the increase in the HHI accounted for 
close to 30 percent of the shift.
5. Influence of CHIPS and DTC 
on Settlement Time
Our regression analysis points to a few specific variables as 
highly explanatory of the shift to later settlement of the 70th-
90th percentiles of Fedwire activity. In this section, we present 
other evidence of the influence of the settlement institutions—
CHIPS and DTC—on the value time distribution of Fedwire 
activity. Specifically, we consider the time at which the peak in 
Fedwire value transfer occurs. Recall Chart 2, which shows that 
the peak in Fedwire value transfer occurred before 17:00 in 
1998 and after 17:00 in 2006.
To illustrate the dependency of the Fedwire value time 
distribution on the behavior of CHIPS settlement timing, we 
measure the timing of the peak of Fedwire activity as the 
midpoint of the ten contiguous minutes of highest value 
transferred during the day. Chart 13 displays the time of the 
peak ten minutes of value transferred on Fedwire from 1997 
through 2006. Each point represents the time at which the 
midpoint of the top ten contiguous minutes of Fedwire value 
settled on each day between 1997 and 2006. We see that prior 
to January 18, 2000, there was a peak at approximately the same 
time daily (although that time varied from day to day). Its time 
trended downward from around 17:00 in 1997 to around 16:48 
in early January 2000. After January 18, 2000, however, a 
distinctly new pattern emerged. Peaks tended to occur at two 
specific times: 16:30 and 17:11, with the most common peak at 
17:11. This is consistent with the observation in Chart 5 that 
the value time distribution of Fedwire changed from a single-
peak distribution to a dual-peak distribution in 2000. 104 Changes in the Timing Distribution 
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The regression analysis suggests a reason for why the shift 
occurred. Prior to January 18, 2000, CHIPS effected its final 
settlement at approximately 16:40; on January 18, 2000 (and 
thereafter), it moved its settlement of final payouts to 
approximately 17:10, while the value-weighted time of DTC’s 
settlement remained roughly constant over the period. 
Examination of Charts 13 and 14 suggests that prior to 
January 18, 2000, Fedwire’s peak of settlement activity 
occurred simultaneously with the roughly coincident 
settlement times of CHIPS and DTC. After January 18, 2000, 
when CHIPS moved to a later settlement time, two peaks of 
settlement activity emerged on Fedwire. One coincided with 
DTC settlement time at 16:30, and the other moved more 
closely to CHIPS settlement time after 17:00. The distinct 
change in pattern, so closely matching the timing pattern of 
CHIPS and DTC, as well as the evidence from the regression 
analysis, points to the timing of the settlement institutions’ 
late-in-the-day settlement as being highly explanatory in the 
timing shifts of Fedwire’s peak and late-day activity over the 
1998-2006 period.
Why should Fedwire’s peak activity in value transfer 
coincide so closely with the final payouts of the major 
settlement institutions? We advance four hypotheses, which 
are not necessarily mutually exclusive: the bank liquidity 
cascade, the customer credit cascade, the resolution of 
uncertainty, and the role played by settlement times as 
focal points.
First, we advance our bank liquidity cascade hypothesis. 
Consider the activities of DTC. As we discuss in Appendix B, 
DTC accumulates balances in its account and releases them 
back to the banking system during its final payout procedures. 
That outflow of balances from DTC and the resulting inflow to 
banks can trigger a cascade of payments made by the receivers 
of DTC payouts, which triggers further payments made by 
the receivers of those payments, and so on. The cascade of 
payments can occur if banks are withholding payments because 
they face internal constraints attributable to a cost of liquidity 
or some other limit on their willingness to submit payments 
earlier. Beyeler et al. (2006) provide a model and simulation 
of a similar process.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / September 2008 105
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A second reason for such a release of payments is the related 
customer credit cascade hypothesis. Not only do banks face 
constraints in making timely payments, but so do their 
customers. Those customers, or the depositors of banks, also 
receive funds following payouts on a major settlement system, 
which provides funds to their accounts. If those depositors 
had been withholding payments because they could not easily 
obtain credit to send payments, the inflow of settlement system 
payments could provide the needed funding for them to 
execute their withheld payments; the release of those depositor 
payments could result in the release of payments by the 
receivers of their payments, and so on. 
The resolution-of-uncertainty hypothesis is a third reason 
why banks might release payments after a major settlement 
system’s final payouts. Prior to settling at a major settlement 
institution, banks could be uncertain of the exact amount 
of their payout from the system (or their obligation to the 
system), and there could be some uncertainty about whether 
all parties in the settlement system will perform as expected. 
After the uncertainty is resolved, banks might evaluate more 
precisely the effect of releasing payments, arranging for the 
purchase or sale of federal funds, and making any other 
adjustments.
Finally, banks, according to the focal point hypothesis, 
might coordinate their payment submissions with a settlement 
institution. Banks might choose to release payments after the 
final payouts of a major settlement institution because they 
believe that other banks will do so at the same time. If many 
banks choose to release payments at the same time, each bank 
has a higher likelihood of receiving payments during that peak 
of payment activity; therefore, it is more likely that the banks 
will have a lower cost of funding their outgoing payments at 
that time (by incurring fewer daylight overdrafts and avoiding 
any constraints, such as bumping up against a net debit cap). 
This same phenomenon could hold true for depositors—
a hypothesis discussed in McAndrews and Rajan (2000).
While our analysis cannot clearly distinguish between the 
alternative hypotheses, it is instructive to consider what the 
data might imply about the relative weight of the various 
hypotheses as explanations for the changes observed after 
January 18, 2000. Chart 15 shows the difference in the 
settlement times of CHIPS and DTC and the time of the top ten 
minutes of Fedwire value transferred. A band of five minutes 
on either side of 0 on the y-axis represents the time of 
settlement of the top ten minutes of Fedwire value. A circle 
represents the time of DTC settlement and a triangle the time 106 Changes in the Timing Distribution 
of CHIPS settlement. When a point falls within the five-minute 
band on either side of 0, the settlements of Fedwire and that 
system coincide. The clearest pattern that Chart 15 displays is 
that prior to January 18, 2000, the three systems—CHIPS, 
DTC, and Fedwire—settled roughly simultaneously; after that 
date, CHIPS and DTC settlement times diverged. The time of 
Fedwire peak settlement tends to bounce between the time of 
DTC settlement and a time immediately subsequent to CHIPS 
settlement. This is because, prior to January 18, 2000, it was 
fairly common to have all three systems settle roughly 
simultaneously, so it is difficult to distinguish among the 
various hypotheses. These same patterns are visible in Chart 13.
After January 18, 2000, we see two tendencies. First, on 
days on which the 16:30 peak is the time of the highest value 
transferred on Fedwire, DTC settlement often falls within the 
ten minutes of highest value transferred on Fedwire. Second, 
when the 17:11 peak is the time of highest value transferred on 
Fedwire, it is usually (and increasingly over time) the case that 
CHIPS settlement precedes and falls outside the highest ten 
minutes of Fedwire value transferred.
These tendencies might suggest that DTC settlement kicks 
off a liquidity and customer credit cascade, an observation 
supported by the quickness of value transfer on Fedwire 
following DTC settlement. This observation is also consistent 
with the fact that DTC’s account balances grow over the day 
and are then released with DTC settlement to other banks, 
which effectively increases the short-term supply of liquidity in 
the rest of the banking system. However, the fact that the peak 
of activity follows CHIPS settlement with only some delay 
might suggest that the cause of the activity is more closely 
associated with resolution of uncertainty than with a liquidity 
or credit cascade. This explanation is also consistent with the 
fact that CHIPS settlement is mainly a redistribution of 
balances among banks, rather than a net release of liquidity 
back to banks. The focal point hypothesis might also offer a 
good explanation for the peak that occurs after CHIPS 
settlement. CHIPS is the last major institution to settle; at that 
point in the processing day, most uncertainty about bank 
balances is expected to be resolved and banks might reason that 
it is a good time to send payments after CHIPS has settled.
6. Conclusion
In its report on large-value payments systems, the Committee 
on Payment and Settlement Systems noted that the timing of 
payment submission is a market practice of major importance 
(Bank for International Settlements 2005). It is not uncommon 
for stable behavioral conventions to arise around the time 
when participants submit certain types of payments for 
settlement. Such conventions can arise endogenously among 
direct participants, and non-RTGS payments can be an 
important “exogenous” factor affecting a bank’s RTGS 
liquidity.
Our examination of payment time distribution trends in the 
Fedwire funds service from 1998 to 2006 finds that the lower 
percentiles of timing have moved to earlier in the operating 
day. In addition, the very last percentiles transferred have also 
moved to earlier over the study period, as extensions of the 
Fedwire operating day have become more rare. We also observe 
that while more value settles earlier in the morning and the 
later percentiles of value settle later in the afternoon, the 
distribution of value transferred has become more peaked. 
A greater percentage of value was transferred during the peak 
of activity in 2006 than in the early part of our sample.
We considered a host of factors affecting changes in the 
distribution of Fedwire timing. Federal Reserve policies and 
operations were found to affect settlement times in notable 
ways. Changes to the Federal Reserve’s Payments System Risk 
Policy in 2002, which expanded net debit caps significantly, 
quickened Fedwire settlement in the morning and early 
afternoon, while 2006 policy changes, which lowered 
extensions of daylight credit overall, tended to slow settlement 
throughout the afternoon. Both changes are consistent with 
banks economizing on liquidity costs in their submission of 
payments. Changes in the values and volumes transferred over 
Fedwire have increased over the period, as has the proportion 
of large individual payments. Taken together, these changes 
explain a large share of the later settlement of payments (after 
17:00) over the period. However, we find that a larger value 
of customer payments tends to quicken Fedwire settlement, 
possibly because of the higher delay costs of customer 
payments—another influence noted in the economic 
literature. 
There were numerous changes in settlement institutions 
over the period. The introduction of CLS Bank operation and 
the values transferred by CLS Bank appear to have had little 
effect on the value time distribution on Fedwire. Changes in 
CHIPS operations had countervailing effects, with a 2000 move 
toward later settlement time by CHIPS clearly contributing to 
a later peak in Fedwire activity. The move by CHIPS to intraday 
finality in 2001, though, tended to speed settlement of the 
40th-80th percentiles of Fedwire value. Increased values 
transferred by CHIPS tended to delay settlement on Fedwire 
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for the 50th-80th percentiles, while on DTC heightened values 
quickened early settlement and delayed mid-afternoon 
settlement. A payment market that has grown more concen-
trated had a significant influence on the later settlement of 
Fedwire value. These results reflect the various calendar effects 
and activity in other financial markets included in our 
regression analysis.
A major contributor to the later settlement of Fedwire 
payments was the change in CHIPS settlement time from 
roughly 16:45 to 17:10 on January 18, 2000. The time of 
the midpoint of the highest ten minutes of Fedwire value 
transferred moved in a remarkably coincident fashion from 
16:48 to 17:11 on that date. This pattern persisted, with the 
Fedwire value time distribution displaying two main peaks: 
one remaining at 16:30, nearly coincident with DTC settle-
ment, and one at 17:11, shortly after the time of CHIPS final 
payouts. Over time, these new peaks of activity have 
been stable.
Our results also suggest that changes in the value of 
interbank payments and in the number of daily Fedwire 
transfers can explain most of the daily variation in the time 
of value transferred on Fedwire after 17:00. The rare case of 
an extension of CHIPS operating hours delays virtually all 
payments submitted after 17:00, a clear illustration of the 
interdependence between Fedwire and CHIPS.
In addition, we estimate that increases in the number and 
value of Fedwire payments between 1998 and 2006 contributed 
slightly more than 40 percent to the long-run change in the 
75th percentile of the value time distribution of payments. 
Of this amount, the aggregate contribution of CHIPS may be 
estimated at around 10 percent, and the increase in industry 
concentration accounted for close to 30 percent.
The clear interdependence between payment timing on 
Fedwire and CHIPS reinforces the points made in the 
Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems’ report 
on large-value payments systems (Bank for International 
Settlements 2005). The role of settlement institutions that 
utilize Fedwire for pay-ins and payouts is a major factor 
determining system activity. This article has reviewed a 
number of hypotheses on the possible channels through which 
settlement systems affect Fedwire activity. Further research on 
these channels would indeed provide a better understanding 
of the factors that affect the timing distribution of payments 
in large-value systems.
Also deserving of further research is the effect of increased 
industry concentration on the timing of payments, a topic that 
has not been explored in the theoretical literature. Further-
more, researchers could benefit from conducting similar 
studies of other payments systems to ascertain the effects of 
daylight credit policies, system operations, settlement systems, 
industrial structure, and other determinants of payment 
timing. Their results could shed light on the robustness 
of our results.108 Changes in the Timing Distribution 
Our data source is Federal Reserve Bank of New York records 
of every Fedwire funds service transaction. Unless otherwise 
stated, data are used to construct the variables below associated 
with Fedwire funds activity. We have data on all Fedwire funds 
transfers between April 1997 and December 2006, except for 
April 1, 1997; December 22-24, 1997; March 1-3, 1999; 
April 20-22, 1999; October 14-15, 1999; October 18, 1999; 
and November 9, 1999. 
Variables
ith percentile of value time is the time at which i percent of 
the total daily value has settled. We exclude payments to 
or from CHIPS, CLS Bank, and DTC. We also exclude 
payments associated with interest and redemption payments 
of government-sponsored enterprises and international 
institutions after the Federal Reserve’s Payments System Risk 
Policy change on July 1, 2006. These payments related to P&I 
(principal and interest) are Fedwire funds payments between 
two different accounts of the securities issuer, that is, payments 
from the general account to the funding account and from 
the funding account to the distribution account.
Foreign Capital Equivalency Policy is a binary variable equal to 
1 on and after February 21, 2002, when the Federal Reserve 
changed the criteria for determining U.S. capital equivalency 
for foreign banks. This policy change increased the sum of the 
net debit caps of all Fedwire funds participants by $123 billion, 
or 12 percent (see Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System [2001]).
GSE credit policy is a binary variable equal to 1 on and after 
July 1, 2006. The Federal Reserve changed its Payments System 
Risk Policy to require GSEs and international organizations to 
fully fund interest and redemption payments on securities 
before the funds are sent, and it removed the provision of free 
intraday credit to these issuers (Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System 2004; McAndrews 2006).
MBS P&I day, pre-GSE policy is a binary variable equal to 1 
on the 15th and 25th of the month, or the first business day 
thereafter, before the change in GSE credit policy on July 1, 
2006. On these days, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac make 
interest and redemption payments on mortgage-backed 
securities (MBSs). These are generally the largest interest and 
redemption payment days of the month.
MBS P&I day, post-GSE policy is a binary variable equal to 1 
on the 15th and 25th of the month, or the first business day 
thereafter, after the change in GSE credit policy on July 1, 2006.
Fedwire opens at 21:00 is a binary variable equal to 1 for all 
days on or after May 17, 2005. On that date, the Federal Reserve 
extended the operating hours of the Fedwire funds service from 
18 hours to 21.5 hours by moving the opening time from 00:30 
to 21:00 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
2003).
Operating hour extension is the number of minutes that the 
Fedwire funds service remains open after 18:30. The Federal 
Reserve will occasionally extend Fedwire’s operating hours at 
the request of a participant having operational difficulties or 
if the system is experiencing operational problems (Bank for 
International Settlements 2005). 
Fed funds target rate — Source: <http://www.ny.frb.org/
markets/omo/dmm/fedfunds.cfm>.
Interbank payment value is the sum of the payment values of 
all Fedwire funds transfers that are not fed funds deliveries, fed 
funds returns, customer payments, or settlement payments for 
CHIPS, CLS Bank, or DTC, or that are not principal and 
interest redemptions.
Customer payment value is the sum of the payment values 
of all Fedwire funds transfers with a business function code 
of customer payment. 
Fed funds deliveries is the total value of new fed funds loans. 
These loans were identified from Fedwire funds transactions, 
as in Furfine (1999).
Fed funds returns is the total value of the returns of the fed 
funds loans. It is equal to the value of fed funds deliveries for 
the previous business day plus the interest on those loans. 
These loans were identified from Fedwire funds transactions, 
as in Furfine (1999). 
Payments   $10 mn. is the fraction of daily value from 
payments greater than or equal to $10 million. This excludes 
all CHIPS, CLS Bank, DTC, and P&I funding payments. The 
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threshold value of $10 million is the value used in a survey 
of bank intraday liquidity management conducted by the 
Payments Risk Committee and the Wholesale Customer 
Advisory Group (2007).
Number of payments is the daily number of Fedwire funds 
payments, including interbank, customer, and fed funds 
transactions, but excluding all CHIPS, CLS Bank, DTC, and 
P&I funding payments.
CHIPS settlement at 17:00 — CHIPS settlement time is a 
binary variable equal to 1 for all days on or after January 18, 
2000. On that date, the time at which end-of-day CHIPS 
payouts occurred moved from approximately 16:45 to 17:10.
CHIPS intraday finality is a binary variable set to 1 for all dates 
on or after January 22, 2001. This is the date when CHIPS 
moved from an end-of-day multilateral net debit system 
to a mixed-payments system with intraday finality.
CHIPS final payout value is the value of the end-of-day 
payouts sent by CHIPS over Fedwire to CHIPS participants 
with a net credit position.
CHIPS extension is a binary variable for a later-than-normal 
CHIPS final payout time. This is defined as a CHIPS final 
payout occurring after 17:00 for days before January 18, 2000, 
and after 17:15 otherwise.
DTC settlement time is the value-weighted mean time of 
Fedwire funds payments sent by DTC after 16:00.
DTC net-net credit value is the sum of all Fedwire funds 
payments sent by DTC after 16:00.
CLS Bank opens is a binary variable equal to 1 for all days on 
or after September 10, 2002, when CLS Bank International 
began settling U.S. dollar transactions.
CLS Bank USD value is the daily sum of payments sent by CLS 
Bank over Fedwire. It is equivalent to the value of all U.S. dollar 
legs settled by CLS Bank.
Sep. 11-18, 2001, is a binary variable equal to 1 for those dates. 
This is the period in which the Fedwire payments system was 
disrupted by the terrorist attacks on September 11 
(McAndrews and Potter 2002).
NYSE closures and NYSE early closures — Source: <http://
www.nyse.com/pdfs/closings.pdf>. 
Reserve maintenance cycle days are binary variables for the 
days in a reserve maintenance cycle. The maintenance cycle is a 
two-week period starting on a Thursday (see Federal Reserve 
Banks [2006] for the starting and ending dates of maintenance 
cycles). We include dummies for all days of the week with 
Thursdays—the first day of the reserve maintenance cycle—as 
the excluded group. To disentangle the effect of the main-
tenance cycle above from any day-of-week effects, we include 
binary variables for maintenance days in the second week of the 
maintenance cycles, that is, days 6-10.
HHI of Fedwire value is the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index of 
the value of Fedwire funds payments sent by master accounts. 
Fed funds deviation is the difference between the effective fed 
funds rate and the target fed funds rate. Source: <http://
www.ny.frb.org/markets/omo/dmm/fedfunds.cfm>.
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CHIPS
CHIPS is a private, large-value U.S. dollar payments system 
owned and operated by the Clearing House Payments 
Company (Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2002; Bank for 
International Settlements 2003b, 2005). As of April 2007, 
CHIPS had 45 members and settled 329,000 transactions 
valued at $1.7 trillion per day.11 From its opening in 1970 until 
2001, CHIPS operated as an end-of-day multilateral net debit 
settlement system: After CHIPS closed at 04:30 (05:00 after 
January 18, 2000), participants with negative net positions 
would send payments to CHIPS over Fedwire to cover their 
positions; CHIPS would then send payments to those 
participants with net positive positions. 
On January 22, 2001, CHIPS adopted intraday payment 
finality with a continuous offsetting algorithm to optimize 
liquidity. All CHIPS participants must fund their accounts with 
a Fedwire transfer to CHIPS between the opening of Fedwire and 
09:00 before they can send or receive payments. These balances, 
totaling about $3 billion, are used to settle payments during 
CHIPS operating hours. At the close of CHIPS at 17:00, any 
unsettled payments are multilaterally netted. These net positions 
are settled over Fedwire via transfers to and from CHIPS.
CLS Bank
CLS Bank is a payment-versus-payment settlement system 
that settles foreign exchange transactions in fifteen currencies 
(CLS Bank 2007; Miller and Northcott 2002; Bank for 
International Settlements 2003a, 2005). CLS Bank is operated 
by CLS Bank International, a bank-owned Edge Act 
corporation incorporated in the United States. CLS Bank was 
founded in response to concerns raised by the G-10 central 
banks about settlement risk in foreign exchange transactions
11 Source: CHIPS (<http://www.chips.org/about/pages/001221.php>).
(Bank for International Settlements 1993). CLS Bank began 
operation in September 2002; as of December 2006, it had 
57 members and settled an average of 290,000 transactions 
valued at $3.3 trillion per day.12
CLS Bank uses a payment-versus-payment method in which 
funds to settle trades are exchanged simultaneously in different 
currencies. In order to accomplish simultaneous transfers, CLS 
Bank is open during the five-hour settlement window—01:00 
to 06:00 EST—when real-time gross settlement systems in 
Europe, the Americas, and Asia are open. 
DTC
DTC is a securities settlement system that settles the 
majority of U.S. corporate securities and commercial paper 
transactions. It is a wholly owned subsidiary of Depository 
Trust & Clearing Corporation (Bank for International 
Settlements 2003a, 2005). DTC has 407 participants and 
86 settling banks. On average, it settles 800,000 transactions 
valued at $896 billion per day (Payments Risk Committee 
and Wholesale Customer Advisory Group 2007).
DTC participants fund their accounts through Fedwire 
transfers (via a settlement bank for many) to the DTC Federal 
Reserve account. Money market instruments represent 
62 percent of DTC value. The ability of paying agents to accept 
maturing securities is limited by the agents’ net debit cap. 
To remove the debit cap constraint, agents will make progress 
payments to their accounts via Fedwire transfers to DTC. The 
majority of this activity occurs between 12:00 and 14:00. At 
16:00, the DTC settlement process begins. Banks with net 
debits send the net amount to DTC over the net settlement 
system at 16:35. At 16:40, DTC sends Fedwire funds transfers 
to participants with net credits (Payments Risk Committee and 
Wholesale Customer Advisory Group 2007).
12 Source: CLS Bank International (<http://www.cls-group.com/news/
article.cfm?objectid=78EA8ED8-EC63-6345-C60967F0ECA7E5C3>).
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